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Re-Humanizing Descartes
 
 Alison Simmons
I. Descartes’ Troubles
 Descartes has a bad reputation in the academy. Academics use the word 
“Cartesian” in much the way one uses the word “Jesuitical”: if an idea is 
described as “Cartesian” you can be pretty sure you don’t want to be associated 
with it. So what did Descartes say that is so objectionable? There are, I think, 
two Cartesian theses that are largely responsible for the bad reputation, one 
metaphysical and one epistemological. The metaphysical thesis is mind-body 
dualism, viz., the claim that mind and body are separate things that can exist 
apart from each other so that if the body dies the mind can go right on existing 
without it (perhaps rejoicing in its liberation), and if the mind were to retreat the 
body would continue to exist just as before. The suspect epistemological thesis 
is the thesis that the mind can and should seek knowledge that is Objective 
(capital “O”), adopting, as Thomas Nagel puts it, the “view from nowhere” or, 
as Bernard Williams puts it, the “absolute conception of reality.”1 What’s so bad 
about dualism and the quest for Objectivity? In short: they are de-humanizing. 
For together the suspect theses suggest a goal of disembodied minds seeking to 
understand the world from no particular point of view. And that is nothing like 
our own human experience. We are not, we want to say, minds that wear our 
bodies like an uncomfortable pair of jeans; we are bodily through and through. 
Morevoer, we can’t and shouldn’t try to attain a view of the world from nowhere; 
we are, after all, decidedly somewhere (namely, where our bodies are), and where 
we are matters to what we believe and do. Cartesian philosophy, it seems, is not 
a human philosophy.
 My aim here is to re-humanize Descartes. I’m not going to deny that he was 
a dualist (he was). And I’m not going to claim that Descartes had no interest in 
Objectivity (he clearly did). But I am going to claim that this is only part of the 
Cartesian story. What’s more, it’s the part of the story without human beings, 
and so it should be no surprise that it’s de-humanizing. Until recently there has 
been relatively little attention paid to what Descartes actually says about human 
beings.2 This oversight is understandable: Descartes himself puts off giving an 
account of human beings repeatedly in his works, and whenever he turns to the 
topic he struggles. Still, when we take a closer look at what Descartes does say, 
the theses of dualism and Objectivity are cast in a new light.
 My aim is not simply to set the record straight and salvage Descartes’ 
reputation. I also want to make a methodological point. I just mentioned that 
Descartes repeatedly puts off the topic of the human being and that when turns to 
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it he struggles. Here is what I have in mind. Descartes’ early work, L’Homme (The 
Treatise on Man), introduces fictional creatures that are meant to illuminate the 
nature of real human beings. It opens as follows: “These men will be composed, 
as we are, of a soul and a body. First I must describe the body on its own; then 
the soul, again on its own; and finally I must show how these two natures would 
have to be joined and united in order to constitute men who resemble us” 
(AT XI 119-120, CSM I 99).3 The work breaks off (either because lost or never 
finished) before any treatment of the mind on its own or its relation to body in 
the human being. The Meditations on First Philosophy doesn’t get to the nature 
of human beings until half way through Meditation 6, and his treatment there 
is as brief as it is puzzling. In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes throws up his 
hands at giving a full account of human beings, writing:
I would not add anything further to this fourth part of the Principles of 
Philosophy if, as I originally planned, I was going on to write two further 
parts—a fifth part on living things, i.e., animals and plants, and a sixth 
part on man. But I am not yet completely clear about all the matters 
which I would like to deal with there, and I do not know whether I 
shall ever have enough free time to complete these sections. So, to avoid 
delaying the publication of the first four parts any longer… I shall here 
add a few observations concerning the objects of the senses. (AT VIII-A 
315, CSM I, 279)
Descartes somehow gets pushed up against the wall when it comes to giving an 
account of human beings. But (and here’s the methodological point) it’s often 
precisely when a philosopher is pressed against the wall that he does some of his 
most interesting and creative work. I think that’s true of Descartes on the human 
being. I am therefore going to jump right into the mess, and ask how Descartes’ 
reflections on human beings (messy as they may be) might change the way we think 
about his more familiar commitments to dualism and the quest for Objectivity.
II. Metaphysics of the Cartesian Human Being
 Let’s start with dualism. As a substance dualist, Descartes is committed to 
there being what he calls a “real distinction” between mind and body, such that 
each can exist as a substance (or thing) in its own right apart from the other. 
Given dualism, it’s easy to suppose that a human being, a creature with both 
mind and body, must simply be some sort of aggregate of the two. Specialists and 
non-specialists alike have had something to say about this portrait of the human 
being. Jonathan Bennett, a specialist, described the Cartesian human being for 
the readers of this journal as follows:
3
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Descartes bequeathed to his successors what he and they thought to be 
a sharp, deep split between the mental and the material. He thought it 
was a split between things, with every thing belonging to one of the two 
kinds and no thing belonging to both. According to him, a human being 
is a pair, a duo, a mind and a body; or, more strictly, a human being is a 
mind that is tightly related to an animal body. The exact nature of that 
relation was one of the problems that Descartes never solved to his own 
satisfaction, let alone to anyone else’s.4
In fact, however, the Cartesian human being is not a mere aggregate of mind and 
body forced to interact with each other like unfriendly roommates: it is not a 
pair (like a pair of socks) or a duo (like Sonny and Cher, or salt and pepper). A 
Cartesian human being is no more an aggregate of mind and body than a cake 
is an aggregate of flour, butter, sugar and eggs. Descartes insists that the human 
being is a union of mind and body in which mind and body are so intermingled that 
they form a single thing (AT VII 81, CSM II 56). You cannot generate a human 
being by taking one part mind and one part body and shaking them together a 
bit. Some metaphysical chemistry has to occur to get a human being, just as some 
physical chemistry has to occur to get a cake. Now I’m not going to pretend that 
Descartes’ notion of a mind-body union is problem-free. It is full of problems, 
and I will gesture to them in what follows. What interests me is that Descartes 
felt the need to say that a human being is more than a mere aggregate of mind 
and a body, especially when he knew very well that this claim was going to be 
problematic for his metaphysics. Why take that troubling extra step?
 It will help to look first at what an aggregate of mind and body would actually 
look like in the Cartesian context. The way to do that is to ask what a Cartesian 
mind is (on its own), and what a body is (on its own). Putting those together will 
give us the aggregate that I’m suggesting falls short of a human being.
 What, then, is a Cartesian mind, considered on its own, divorced from the 
body? It is something like an angel: a pure intellect.5 The mind on its own has 
no sensations, no passions: no itches, no tickles, no color experiences, no flavor 
sensations, no pain, no pleasure, no hunger, no thirst, no fear, no anger, no 
sadness, no love. This point is obscured by the tendency to treat consciousness as 
constitutive of the Cartesian mind. This all too frequent identification of mind 
with consciousness derives largely from the laundry list of things that Descartes 
includes among the mind’s thoughts in the middle of Meditation 2 and again 
at the start of Meditation 3: “But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is 
that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, 
and also imagines and senses” (AT VII 28, CSM II 28; see also AT VII 34, CSM 
II 24). What do all these things have in common? Consciousness is an obvious 
answer. So, the reasoning goes, the Cartesian mind must be at bottom a conscious 
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thing, where consciousness covers everything from pure intellection to pain 
sensations.6 Earlier in Meditation 2, however, when Descartes first asks what his 
mind is, he describes it more narrowly: “a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or 
reason” (AT VII 27, CSM II 18). Interestingly, in the laundry list of thoughts that 
follow a few paragraphs later, imagining and sensing get tacked onto the more 
properly intellectual thoughts by a curiously hesitant “and also…” (quoque). A 
similar thing happens in Meditation 6. As Marleen Rozemond has argued, when 
Descartes argues for mind-body dualism in Meditation 6, the argument turns on 
the narrower conception of mind as pure intellect and it is only after the argument 
for dualism is concluded that Descartes turns to consider imagination and the 
senses, writing: “Besides this [i.e., besides intellect], I find in myself faculties for 
certain special modes of thinking, namely imagining and sensing” (AT VII 78, 
CSM II 54).7 Imagining and sensing are included as last minute additions to the 
mind because they “include intellection in their essential definition” (AT VII 78, 
CSM II 54). The intellect is essential to something’s being a mind; imagining and 
sensing are optional. What is more, while intellection is included in the “essential 
definition” of imagining and sensing, it does not exhaust their nature. Indeed, 
imaging and sensing cannot be made sense of strictly in terms of mind. In the 
Principles of Philosophy Descartes tells us quite explicitly that sensations (and also 
passions) “must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone…
[but] arise…from the intimate union of our mind with the body” (AT VIII-A 23, 
CSM I 209). And again: “[sensations] do not come from [the mind] alone, and 
they cannot belong to it simply in virtue of its being a thinking thing; instead, 
they can belong to it only in virtue of its being joined to…the human body” (AT 
VIII-A 41, CSM I 224). He flat out tells Henry More: “the human mind separated 
from the body does not have sensations” (AT V 402, CSMK 380).8 He says the 
same of the passions at Passions of the Soul II.137: they “belong to the soul only 
insofar as it is joined with the body” (AT XI 430, CSM I 376). The mind in and 
of itself has only purely intellectual thoughts. Now there are plenty of puzzles for 
the Descartes scholar to work out concerning the nature of the mind on its own, 
viz., the pure intellect: does it apprehend only universals or particulars too? Is 
its thought conceptual? Discursive? Tied up with language? The key for present 
purposes is that the mind on its own, as pure intellect, does not have imagination, 
sensory experience or passions, arguably among the most salient of human thoughts.
 What about bodies? What are they like on their own, metaphysically divorced 
from mind? This side of the equation is a bit less contentious, since Descartes 
devotes the bulk of his work in physics (or natural philosophy) to describing 
mind-free bodies and their operations. Cartesian bodies are extended things, 
with parts of different sizes and shapes that move in various ways, and that 
impact each other in various ways. Consider Principles II.4: “the nature of matter 
or body considered in general consists…simply in its being something which is 
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extended in length, breath and depth” (AT VIII-A 42, CSM I 224). Here too 
there are plenty of puzzles to keep the Descartes scholar employed: How are 
bodies individuated? How many bodies are there in the Cartesian universe (one, 
infinitely many, something in between)? Is the force that moves bodies intrinsic 
or extrinsic to body? For present purposes what matters is that Cartesian bodies, 
considered independently of mind, are all and only extended things. They are, 
in short, machines (see Principles IV.188, AT VIII-A 315, CSM I 279).
 If the world were populated by Cartesian minds and bodies, it would be 
populated by angels and machines. And if human beings were just aggregates or 
pairs or duos of mind and body, they would be angels in machines (just as Gilbert 
Ryle suspected9). De-humanizing indeed!  But that is exactly what Descartes denies 
in Meditation 6 when he argues that the relationship between mind and body 
in the human being is not like the relationship between a pilot and his ship: “I 
am not merely present in my body as a pilot is present in a ship but…I am very 
closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form 
a unit [unam quid]” (AT VII 81, CSM II 56). What is Descartes’ argument for 
the claim that mind and body are more closely connected than a pilot and his 
ship? The fact that we experience sensations like hunger, thirst, or more generally 
pain and pleasure. These sensations, he insists, cannot be made sense of on the 
pilot-in-a-ship or, equivalently, the angel-in-a-machine model. Why not? Because 
sensations are not purely intellectual thoughts of the sort a pure intellect has. If 
we were angels in machines, pure intellects lodged in bodies, we would experience 
not sensations like hunger or thirst, but instead “an explicit understanding of 
the fact that the body needed food or drink” (AT VII 81, CSM II 56). We would 
have intellectual thoughts about the conditions of the machine we are inhabiting. 
But in fact we have no such thing. We have sensations of hunger and thirst. This, 
Descartes argues, implies a different (closer) relation between mind and body than 
mere inhabitation or aggregation. Descartes rehearses exactly the same argument 
in his correspondence with his wayward fan, Regius, who had been telling people 
that the human being is an ens per accidens, in effect a mere aggregate of mind 
and body or angel in a machine. Descartes corrects him as follows:
you should say that you believe that a human being is a true ens per se, 
and not an ens per accidens, and that the mind is united in a real and 
substantial manner to the body. You must say that they are united not 
by position or disposition, as you asserted in your last paper—for this 
too is open to objection and is in my opinion quite untrue—but by a 
true mode of union, as everyone agrees, though nobody explains what 
this amounts to, and so you need not do so either. You could do so, 
however, as I did in my Metaphysics [the Meditations], by saying that we 
perceive that sensations such as pain are not pure thoughts of a mind 
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distinct from a body, but confused perceptions of a mind really united 
to a body. For if an angel were in a human body, he would not have 
sensations as we do, but would simply perceive the motions which are 
caused by external objects, and in this way would differ from a real 
man…” (AT III 493, CSMK 206).10
Sensations, then, provide the evidence that the human being is not simply an 
aggregate of mind and body—an angel lodged in a bodily machine--but rather a 
peculiar metaphysical union of the two.
 Saying that being human must involve a metaphysical union of mind and 
body is one thing. Making sense of it is another. Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia 
pressed Descartes on the nature of this union and Descartes offered the following 
infuriating response: “It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable 
of forming a very distinct conception of both the distinction between the soul 
and the body and their union; for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as 
a single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is 
absurd” (AT III 493, CSMK 206). Indeed! That’s simply to state the problem: 
having shown us so painstakingly how to conceive mind and body as two distinct 
things, it’s difficult now to conceive them as united into a single thing. Remarkably, 
Descartes suggests that while the pure intellect cannot really conceive the union, 
“it is known very clearly by the senses” and that “it is in the ordinary course of life 
and conversation, and abstention from [philosophical] meditation…that teaches 
us how to conceive the union of the soul and the body” (AT III 692, CSMK 
227). This is a serious concession on Descartes’ rationalism: the senses rarely get 
the epistemic upper hand in Descartes, and yet here he says they do. Descartes 
realizes that mind and body must somehow be related in a way that goes beyond 
mere aggregation to yield a genuine human being, even if the intellect can’t quite 
wrap itself around the idea.
 Many able scholars have gone to great lengths to make sense of the metaphysics 
of the mind-body union. At one extreme, Paul Hoffman and John Cottingham 
argue that the human being is a third kind of substance so that Descartes is really 
a trialist and not a dualist; at the other extreme, Vere Chappell argues that the 
union just amounts to there being a causal relation between mind and body; and 
there are many suggestions in between.11 In the end, I do not think Descartes 
had a worked out metaphysics of the union. If he had, he would have done more 
than offer the metaphor of intermingling (permixtione) and a baffling comparison 
of the relation of mind to body with the accidentia realia of his predecessors’ 
theories.12 He rests content with our knowing that there is one (we, after all, are 
the evidence) without our being able to understand (but only sensorily experience) 
it, as he insists to Elizabeth.
 Whatever mystery still shrouds the mind-body union, it transforms Cartesian 
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dualism in several ways. I argued above that a Cartesian dualism of pure or 
separated minds and bodies is a dualism of angels and machines. The union of 
mind and body transforms things dramatically. We now have minds (angels), 
bodies (machines), and human beings. While I do not think the union introduces 
a third kind of substance into the picture, Descartes does say that it introduces 
a new nature into the picture, human nature, which bodies and minds alone do 
not have. In Meditation 6 he writes:
I am [here] taking nature to be something more limited than the totality 
of things bestowed on me by God. For this [the totality of things bestowed 
on me by God] includes many things that belong to the mind alone…but 
at this stage I am not speaking of these matters. It also includes much 
that relates to the body alone, but I am not speaking of these matters 
either. My sole concern here is with what God has bestowed on me as 
a combination of mind and body [that is, as a human being]. (AT VII 
82, CSM II 57)
This human nature that Descartes speaks of (in opposition to his bodily extended 
nature and his mental intellectual nature) is a sensory and passionate nature. This 
nature teaches him many things: that he has a body, that it has certain limits, that 
when he feels a pain there is something wrong with his body, that other bodies 
can impact him for good or ill, and so on (AT VII 81, CSM II 56). I’ll look at the 
epistemological character of this sensory and passionate human nature below. 
For now I simply want to underscore what may sound surprising: that according 
to Descartes, human nature is a sensory and passionate nature. (One might be 
tempted to interject here and say, “yes, but didn’t Descartes think that this is a 
bad thing to be overcome?”  I’ll argue in the next section that the answer to this 
question is a resounding “no.”)
 This sensory and passionate human nature that emerges with the mind-body 
union suggests that united minds and bodies have properties that separated minds 
and bodies do not have; minds and bodies are transformed by the union. The 
body, for its part, changes in two ways. First, its individuation conditions change. 
Bodies on their own are individuated by their quantity in the Cartesian scheme 
of things.13 Human bodies, by contrast, are individuated by the soul to which 
they are united, with the result that a given human body can undergo many 
changes in its quantity (as the man grows, ages, loses limbs, etc.) while remaining 
numerically the same body throughout. Here is Descartes on the distinction:
The word body is very ambiguous. When we speak of a body in general, 
we mean a determinate part of matter, a part or quantity of which the 
universe is composed. In this sense, if the smallest amount of that 
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quantity were removed we would judge without more ado that the body 
was smaller and no longer complete; and if any particle of the matter 
were changed, we would think that the body is at once no longer the 
same, no longer numerically the same. But when we speak of the body 
of a man, we do not mean a determinate part of matter, or one that has 
a determinate size; we mean the whole of the matter that is united with 
the soul of that man. And so, even though that matter changes, and its 
quantity increases or decreases, we still believe that it is the same body, 
numerically the same body, so long as it remained joined and substantially 
united with the same soul.14
As a surprising consequence, Descartes is prepared to say that while body on 
its own is by its very nature infinitely divisible, the human body is an important 
sense indivisible:
I do not think that there is any particle of our body, which remains 
numerically the same for a single moment although our body, qua human 
body, remains always numerically the same so long as it is united with 
the same soul. In that sense, it can even be called indivisible; because if 
an arm or a leg of a man is amputated, we think that this is only in the 
first sense of ‘body’ that his body is divided—we do not think that a man 
who has lost an arm or a leg is less a man than any other.15
Body, then, is transformed from a mass of extended divisible stuff to something 
with functional and even numerical unity, into a human body, when it is united 
with a mind.16
 The second way in which body changes through its union with mind is that 
it acquires properties it does not have on its own. These new properties include 
health and illness. In the Cartesian context, bodies on their own are hunks of 
extended stuff with parts that are governed by the laws of motion. Human bodies 
are organisms that have a functional integrity that needs to be maintained for the 
human being to remain alive, and so some of its states are healthy and others ill. 
Suppose I slip while hiking and tear a ligament in my foot. Insofar as the foot is 
a hunk of extended stuff, there is nothing wrong with it, any more than there is 
anything wrong when a rock tumbling down the hillside breaks in two: its parts 
are just following the laws of motion. But insofar as the foot is part of human 
body that relies on its feet to get around, there is something genuinely wrong 
with it—it counts as injured.17
 As for the mind, it too is transformed by the union. As an embodied mind 
it is subject to a range of thoughts it is not subject to as a mind on its own. As I 
pointed out above, sensations, imaginings, and passions are thoughts that only the 
9
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embodied mind enjoys (or suffers or endures). What’s more, they bear the mark 
of embodiment. Sensory ideas and imaginings are imagistic—phenomenologically 
they take up space, so that I can, with noticeable effort, scan the sides of a triangle 
that is seen or imagined in a way that I cannot scan the sides of a triangle that is 
simply understood to be a three-sided planar figure.18 Moreover, everything the 
senses and imagination represent (be it color or shape or pain), they represent 
as modifications of body. They cannot, as it happens, represent immaterial things 
or anything as immaterial. Even the passions, which Descartes insists we “refer” 
to the soul, are nevertheless experienced as taking place in the body; fear, e.g., is 
experienced as taking place in the heart.19 The embodied mind is thus capable 
of forms of representation that are quite alien to the separated mind, and these 
forms of representation all implicate the body not just in their causal etiology 
but in their phenomenology.
 That our sensory and passionate experience is at its core an embodied 
experience is not, then, an anti-Cartesian point, as it is sometime portrayed, but 
rather a decidedly Cartesian point. In his book Descartes’ Error, Antonio Damasio 
bemoans Descartes’ “abyssal separation between body and mind…the suggestion 
that reasoning, and moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from physical 
pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body.”20 The error 
here is Damasio’s, for while some forms of reasoning might take place in a 
disembodied Cartesian mind, Descartes is quite emphatic about the thoroughly 
embodied nature of our physical and emotional suffering and pleasure.21
 Let me sum up: the Cartesian human being is a union (not an aggregate) of 
mind and body; as such the human being has a nature that is different from that 
of mind alone or body alone or a mere aggregate of the two; and as members in 
the union, mind and body are themselves transformed by taking on properties 
they do not have on their own. None of this undermines Descartes’ dualism, but 
it does complicate it a good deal. It remains the case that the mind and body of 
the human being can exist apart from each other. But that’s all Cartesian dualism 
is committed to, viz., the modal claim that mind and body can exist apart from 
each other (i.e., can be separated by God). Descartes does not say that mind and 
body do exist apart from each other in the human being. And it’s clear from the 
material I’ve discussed that they do not. But if and when our minds and bodies 
are separated, they will undergo significant changes, effectively turning into an 
angel and a mere machine. This separation of mind and body that dualism allows 
for is indeed de-humanizing. But now the de-humanizing is appropriate: for this 
separation comes at death, when the human being ceases to be.22
10
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 41 [2011], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol41/iss1/2
62  Alison Simmons
III. Epistemology of the Cartesian Human Being
 What about Cartesian Objectivity? Perhaps Descartes admits we have 
a deeply sensory and passionate nature, but doesn’t he then insist that we 
should overcome this nature in our search after truth and aim at a conception 
of the world that is wholly intellectual, where that suggests a conception that is 
disinterested, impartial and aperspectival? The details of this standard reading 
are cashed out at follows. The intellect is Descartes’ epistemological hero, and 
the senses and passions are cast as villains, or at least trouble-makers. It’s the 
intellect that achieves the standard of Objectivity, or the view from nowhere, 
while the senses are mired in subjectivity, partiality, and perspectivism. Through 
the intellect we can achieve “clear and distinct perception” about the essences of 
things, which has the epistemic virtues of being indubitable, certain, and true. 
The senses, by contrast, give us only “obscure” and/or “confused” perception of 
things and thereby stand as obstacles to our search after truth: their deliverances 
are dubitable, uncertain, and typically false.23 The passions are no better: they 
“agitate and disturb” (Passions I.28, AT XI 350, CSM I 339) the contemplating 
mind, and they “almost always cause the goods they represent, as well as the evils, 
to appear much greater and more important than they are” (Passions II.138, AT 
XI 431, CSM I 377). In our search after truth, we must cast off the distorting 
influence of the senses and passions with a battery of skeptical arguments and, 
through careful meditation, discover the angelic intellect within. This does seem 
a rather inhuman conception of our epistemological predicament.
 Once again, there is some truth to this story. Descartes does indeed think we 
are capable of having purely intellectual thought that gets at the essences of things 
in an objective (impartial, aperspectival) kind of way. And this purely intellectual 
thought is indeed supposed to occur independent of the senses, which get in the 
way: “knowing the truth about things outside us belongs to the mind alone [i.e., 
the intellect] and not to the composite of mind and body [and so to the senses]” 
(Meditation 6, AT VII 82-83, CSM II 57) and “we perceive nothing as it is in 
itself by the senses alone” (Principles II.AT VIII-A 37, CSM I 220; see also AT 
VI 40, CSM I 131). Descartes thus separates the business of the intellect from 
the senses. And that explains the battery of skeptical arguments in Meditation 
1 that are designed to “lead the mind away from the senses” (AT VII 12, CSM 
II 9) and “prepare my readers’ minds for the study of things which are related 
to intellect” (AT VII 172, CSM II 121). But as with Dualism in the previous 
sections, that’s not the end of the story. Listen to one more admonishment of 
the senses: “we misuse [the senses] by treating them as reliable touchstones for 
immediate judgments about the essential nature of the bodies located outside 
us” (AT VII 83, CSM II 57-58). We misuse the senses. He elsewhere compares this 
misuse to “trying to use one’s eyes in order to hear sounds or smell odors” (AT 
11
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VI 37, CSM I 129). The senses aren’t up to the job of discerning the essences of 
things. But, and this is the important point, they aren’t supposed to be. In the 
cognitive economy of the Cartesian human mind, sensations and passions have 
their own job to do. They arise not only from the mind-body union but also for the 
mind-body union. This is a critical part of the story that tends to be overlooked 
by apologists and critics alike, and it’s something I want to explore a bit here.
 Cartesian human beings, I argued above, are mind-body unions (in some 
strong sense), and they have an interest in their own continued existence as 
mind-body unions. In order for the union to survive, however, the body must be 
kept intact and in good working order: its functional integrity must be preserved. 
Now the human body is constantly impacted by other bodies in its environment, 
and impacted in ways that affect its well-being. The embodied human mind 
must therefore dedicate a good deal of its cognitive labor to monitoring and 
protecting its body if it is to remain united to it. In order to do that, the mind 
needs to know not simply how things stand in the world (much less what the 
essences of things are), but how they stand relative to its body and especially relative 
to its body’s continued fitness. This is where the senses come in. They provide the 
mind with an unabashedly self-interested, even narcissistic, view of the corporeal 
world: they  “show us external bodies [not] exactly as they are, but only insofar 
as they are related to us and can benefit or harm us” (letter to More, 5 February 
1649, AT V 271, CSMK 362; see also Principles II.3, AT VIII-A 41-42, CSM I 
224; Meditation 6, AT VII 83, CSM II 57; and Passions II.52, AT XI 372, CSM 
I 349). Sensations may not contribute to the intellect’s search after truth, where 
that means the search for an Objective conception of the universe; but that’s 
because they are busy doing something else, viz., contributing to the human 
being’s self-preservation by informing the mind of what the corporeal world is 
like insofar as it may impact its body for good or ill.
 What Descartes effectively does here is re-conceive the function of the 
senses: whereas his Aristotelian predecessors had depicted the senses as cognitive 
handmaids to the intellect, delivering up the raw materials for theoretical knowledge 
about the essences of things, Descartes conceives them as cognitive tools for 
survival. “Sensations,” he writes in Meditation 6, “are, properly speaking, given 
to me by Nature in order to signify to the mind what things would be beneficial 
or harmful to the composite of which it is a part” (AT VII 83, CSM II 57). What’s 
more, he writes, the senses do this reliably: “in matters regarding the well-being 
of the body, all my senses report the truth much more frequently than not” (AT 
VII 89, CSM II 61). The passions have a related function, for they are “given to 
the soul insofar as it is joined to the body, so that their natural function is to 
incite the soul to consent and contribute to the actions that can serve to preserve 
the body or make it more perfect” (Passions II.137, AT XI 430, CSM I 376; see 
also Passions II.1, AT XI 372, CSM I 349). What makes the senses and passions 
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so good for survival? Precisely their lack of Objectivity.
 Let’s see how this is supposed to work with a few examples. Take bodily 
sensations, which include both phenomena like pains, tickles, hunger and 
thirst and phenomena like haptic, proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensations 
(sensations of bodily positions and motions). Descartes sometimes calls bodily 
sensations “internal sensations” and with good reason: they give us a sense of 
our own bodies “from the inside” in a way that the observational senses (seeing, 
touching hearing, etc.) do not. These sensations are especially important to the 
task of self-preservation. First, it is precisely by experiencing bodily sensations 
that I’m able to identify this particular hunk of the corporeal world as mine or as 
me. With their “view from the inside,” they confer a phenomenological sense of 
ownership or self-identity on the body in which they are felt to occur. When I step 
on a nail, I do not simply observe pain-in-a-foot but rather feel pain-in-my-foot or 
pain-in-a-part-of-me. And this is obviously important to self-preservation: perceiving 
the destruction of a foot is one thing (I can take an interest or not); feeling the 
destruction of my foot or me, on the other hand, commands my concern. Compare 
this to the intellect’s representation of the situation: using the pure intellect 
alone, I would fail to single out any particular body as my body or as part of me, 
for the intellect represents all bodies as substances distinct from me, a mind. At 
most, the intellect might represent my body as one that has a unique causal effect 
on me (and that I can have a unique causal effect on in turn). It may, in other 
words, notice that events in this brain are regularly followed by sensations in me 
and vice versa. But there is nothing in the nature of that to suggest that this body 
belongs to me, or is a part of me. Indeed insofar as the intellect identifies this 
body as the persistent cause of its involuntary sensations, especially unpleasant 
ones, it might reasonably choose to assist in its destruction. The destruction 
might initially create a few extra unpleasant sensations, but in the long run this 
seems a small price to pay for freedom from any further annoyances. Here then 
we see the senses are able to do so something the pure intellect cannot: identify 
a body as mine and report on its condition.
 Consider next the gustatory and olfactory sensations of rotten eggs. In 
Meditation 6, Descartes notes that “from the fact that some [sensations] are 
agreeable to me and others disagreeable, it is quite certain that my body, or rather 
my whole self insofar as I am a composite of body and mind, can be affected 
by various beneficial and harmful bodies that surround it” (AT VII 81, CSM II 
56). And indeed the taste and smell of rotten eggs lets me know in no uncertain 
terms that the eggs are not good for me. Now all that is out there in the eggs, 
according to Cartesian physics, is a hunk of extended stuff with a particular 
microstructure, one that, as it happens, is capable of having an effect on the 
microstructure of my body that would render it (qua human body with a certain 
functional integrity) ill. While gustatory and olfactory sensations represent the 
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eggs to me simply and impressively as foul and to be avoided, my intellect would 
represent the eggs as merely having a certain microsctructure. In order to figure 
out that the eggs should not be eaten, the intellect would have to calculate the 
effect the eggs would have on my body. And it would have to recognize that that 
effect is a bad effect, or constitutes illness. Not only is this cumbersome (much 
more efficient to just have that foul smell and taste hit me), but it’s not even 
clear that the intellect would be capable of recognizing the effect of the eggs as 
bad (from the Objective point of view, my body is just a hunk of extended stuff 
that is operating in a way that is perfectly consistent with the laws of motion—
nothing bad about it). So not only do the senses provide a kind of short hand for 
what would be laborious calculations on the part of the intellect; they may even 
communicate a kind of information about the body that the intellect is incapable 
of (normative or evaluative information about its well-being). Subjectivity is of 
the essence here.24
 Finally, consider spatial perception. It is tempting to think that even for a 
Cartesian our sensory perception of spatial properties like size and shape and 
location gets things “as they really are” in the world. But things are a little more 
complicated than that: Descartes rightly notes that our senses represent even the 
spatial features of bodies in a way that makes essential reference to the perceiver, 
and that doing so is essential to our survival.
 Take shape perception. Vision informs me not simply what shape something 
is, but also how that shape is oriented with respect to me. And this is important. 
Simply knowing that the dining room table is rectangular will not help me walk 
around it. I need to know how it is oriented with respect to me if I am to avoid 
bruising myself. Similarly with the perception of location: simply knowing that 
the table is located at a certain position on some cosmic Cartesian coordinate 
system will not help me put a plate on it; I need to know where it is relative to 
where I am standing, plate in hand—where it is from here, e.g., about two feet away 
from me and off to my right. And these things vary from perceiver to perceiver: 
what is two feet off to my right may be five feet off to your left. Similar things 
are true of size perception: simply knowing that a bear is nine feet tall and three 
hundred pounds will not help me know what to do if I encounter one in the 
woods; I need to know that the bear is bigger than me in order to decide that I 
should flee. And I need to know that the bear is coming right at me, not simply 
that it is moving north-north-east, if I am to run in the right direction.
 Putting this in a nutshell: the senses represent the spatial properties of the 
world to us ego-centrically and perspectivally.25 They do not give us the view from 
nowhere, but decidedly the view from here. They thereby put us in a position to 
interact quickly and reliably with the objects in our environment. Descartes is 
not only aware of that fact, but takes it to be essential to sensory representation 
and to our survival. He takes it to be essential to our human condition.
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 How does all this cast a new light on the quest for Objectivity? I’m not saying 
that Descartes had no interest in Objectivity. I’m simply pointing out that this is 
only half the story. Descartes conceives a division of labor in the human mind, and 
while we might not like what he says about the intellect, we should at least take 
a very serious look at what he has to say about the senses and passions. Yes, the 
Cartesian intellect comes with a stock of innate intellectual ideas that represent 
to us the essences of things as they are in themselves (Objectively). It is thereby 
charged with the task of providing the intellectual foundations for the sciences, 
both the science of body (physics) and the science of mind (psychology).26 Descartes 
spends a great deal of time detailing the ways in which our senses represent things 
subjectively, viz., ego-centrically, perspectivally and in fully embodied fashion. 
But this is no shortcoming of senses. It is precisely what enables them to perform 
their function of helping us to stay alive in a world of bodies that are poised to 
promote our health or harm us.
IV. Conclusion
 The aspects of Cartesianism I’ve called attention to, the mind-body union 
that constitutes the human being and the role of the senses and passions in 
serving as guardians of that union, are not the aspects of Cartesianism that are 
highlighted in textbooks. I do not highlight them when I teach Descartes in 
introductory level courses. Descartes himself does not highlight them. That is 
in part because he thinks these things should be obvious to us from our daily 
experience: “it is in the ordinary course of life and conversation, and abstention 
from [philosophy and mathematics], that teaches us how to conceive the union 
of mind and body…Everyone feels that he is a single person with both body and 
thought” (AT III 692-694, CSMK 227). In his philosophy he shines a light on 
things less familiar to us: dualism, because he thinks it is true that mind and body 
can exist apart (albeit in changed states); Objectivity because he thinks we can 
attain it in a limited domain (mathematics and metaphysics). But he also insists 
that these are things we should occupy ourselves with only “once in a lifetime” 
(Meditation 1, AT VII 17, CSM II 12) or at most “a few hours a year” (letter to 
Elizabeth, AT III 693, CSMK 227). He explains to Princess Elizabeth:
I believe that it is very necessary to have properly understood, once in 
a lifetime, the principle of metaphysics, since they are what gives us the 
knowledge of God and of our soul [and, of course, the conception of 
body that grounds Cartesian physics]…But I think also that it would be 
very harmful to occupy one’s intellect frequently in meditating upon 
them, since this would impede it from devoting itself to the functions 
of the imagination and senses. (AT III 695, CSMK 228)
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Meditating on these things once in a lifetime (or a few hours a year) is enough to 
guard against some of the prejudices we are susceptible to in our human condition, 
in particular prejudices that make people resist the possibility of immortality and, 
more important to Descartes, prejudices that make them resist the rising new 
science of his day (his included). The problem, then, is that Descartes was too 
successful. These “once in a lifetime” reflections stuck and we’ve left the Cartesian 
human being behind. I hope to have resurrected him and to have shown that 
the he is far richer and far more familiar to our experience than he is typically 
assumed to be. Descartes’ treatment of human being is recognizably human (even 
insightfully so) after all. It’s what Descartes did to animals that should cause us 
alarm. But that’s a topic for another day.27
  Harvard University
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